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STATEMENT PRESENTED TO THE

HOUSE ARMtD SERVICES COMr-:IIT'l'EE ON H• . R. 2967

A bill to provide f~r strengthening of the Reserve Forces and for other
purposes.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Comrni ttee:

I am, Strom Thurmond, National President of the Reserve Officers Association •.

It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to appear before this distinguished group ~
to present the views of our Association on the various steps that need to be taken /
to strengthen the Reserve Forces of our country.

In such a program lies the real

hop:-:;- st-:::gthening our military security programs ~ nd at the same time reducing
the drain on our e conomyfohich results from the necessity of maintaining a large
active duty force in being.
The Reserve Officers Association supports £,_ul~1 ~ he broad ·objectives and
aspects of the administration's plan/to strengthen the Reserve Forces.

It does,

however, disagree with some of the details of the bill being considered/and also
certain of the purposes which this bill is designed to accomplish.it
As I am sure you gentlemen are aware, our Association ,has/ for several years /
been alarmed at the lack of readiness among the reserves of our armed forces land
the lack of pro; ress in improving that situation.

As evidence of our feelings

in this matter/ we were delighted · to cooperate with the Congress and the Department
of Defense

in

the enactment of the Reserve Forces Act of 1952/which, in our

opinion, provided the necessary authority antj plan upon which to build an adequate
reserve.

Other legislation-, such as the Selective Service Act . of 1948/ and the

Universal Military Training and Service Act, also contained significant authorities
which should have resulted in a much better -reserve structure.

For many reasons,

and certainly there is no need to try to assess responsibility / these laws were
never utili ~ed to the fullest extent/ and the present \lllacceptable .condi.t ion of

.. I ..

-2our reserves is the result. -

The basic fact remains that not only must we find a

way to ~ncrease the number of reservists~ ut we must find acceptable and equitable
way·s to insure th~ir

---- "'-·- -

articipation in reserve activities,

........

The Korean episode occurred at a time when our active force s tructure was at
a low level~and it was imperative that the reserves of the country be utilized,

Today, we have a substantially larger active force structure of approximately
three million officers and men~ vhich should change to some degree~he need to use
reservists for so-ca]led

olice type

-wars.

our world wide commitments have also increase
level.

On the other hand; .

t~, perhaps, proportionally a higher

Stated differently, the deployment of our armed forces and the world vd. de

nature of the threat which faces us has placed a greater requirement for manpower
1
on our active serviees and, therefore itmaywell be that the size of our military

1

1

structure toda,y, in relation to the Jr oblems it must .face, is no
size of our military structure

fflG*

than the

' r t o Korea and its problems at that time.

It should also be noted that numbered among the
f. a million reserve officers and man

thousands of enlisted men.

have served cm active duty continuously
since 1940.
... t
.. •
rt

ive forces today /are ever

tmr+1

Many

Therefore, in no sense of t he

word ean they be considered/ as a part of a reserve force~ esigned to back up the

1

·-

active forces at this time or in the foreseeable future.
considered for

~

Rather they must be
1

purposes/ as career officers and men.

It will be argued by some/ that never abain will we need to call on the reserves
for small wars/ because of the lar ·

active 1: q

.,S

handling such problems-.

Oll this

thesis, the next time our reserves are neededft t will be in an all-out war following the probable use of nuclear weapons against our homelanJith its terrific and
unique problems for our military/ as well as non-military security structure..

This

concept is dangerous/ and is strongly questioned by our Association.

-

Recognizing these problems, and with a complete sense of discouragement as to
the current status of the reserve, we created within the Reserve Officers

- <2-

- ] -Association/ a .Committee :0f extremely com etent

officers

from a~l services, headed by Brig~ General Wendell Westover of ~lbany, New York.
This Committee was directed ~o -s.tudy all facets of this problem/and to b r~ng forth
in general terms/a plan which oo uld. serve as a basis for our Associat;i.on ts position
in the steps being taken to improve our reserve .·structure.
February

It "reported on

6, 195.5 1 to our National Council and Executive Commit,te.e , .as well .as to

the members of the s eveJrftJrvice sections assembled in Washington, fn _?a~t!_ for
the receiving of this report.

It has also been distributed to our membership

generally for comment and suggestion.

The Committee had the benefit of mu.ch of

the thinking that had gone on within the D~fense ·nepartment · and the Office of
Defense Mobilization, and/ in .·rrry opinionh1as competently met the difficult problems
presented to it.
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, I must call your attention to the wonderful
cooperation t hat now exists~between these tw~ government agencies and our
organization .

The Association has been proud of the opportunity given it to work

with them/in considering the various aspects of the reserve problemfohich led to
the legislation pr~sently before you.

We ·reel that this Committee shpuld know of

our high opinion~ f the diligent effort and intelligent leadership that ·has been
given to this problem~ y the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Manpower . and
Personnel, Mr. Carter L. Burgess, and the Director of the .Office of Defense
Mobilization, Dr. ArJ,hur

s.

Flemming.

V!e feel that they are to be complimen.t ed

on evolving a platform on v.hich, with certain modification, we believe a proper
reserve can be developed.
The Association plan, predicated on our Committee Report, is not intended to
be a substitute for the · Department · of Defense recommendations, but rather provides
an
program.

and a more ·

eed

implementation~ f . cert~in aspects of their

Vte have attached to our statement a copy of this report / and request it . be

made a l)art of the officiEllt · record on this bill.

- 3-

Our testimony from nere on will

..
I
I,

~. 4

~·

be designed to indicate ..h2!{ the bilJ. presently before us/needs to . be modified in
bill, as introduced:.,
but to s::,lve more certainly the problems which led to its introductiQn.
Mr.o Chairman, it is difficult to establish the propers artin

more detailed comments.

I feel I have two choicest

J

Ii ther

point for our

the size of the reserve

.,--

'

structure which it is designed to create/ or the individuals who will be in the
program.
The bill before you is 1 in essence, a manpower procurement bilJt ealing
primarily ,v.i.th the problem of securing enlisted manpower for the reserves!"'and
effecting a higher degree in partici ation in the reserve training programs •. Wh!le
we believe that these are onl;

~ :lements of the

start our disc uesi on with the t

problem facing us today/we will

e of individual that we believe should be in the

reserve.
This Association is in acoord with the concept/that j.V~;fl able-bodi~d, malex
.American owes, as an obligation of citizenship~ a certain amount of
Military,

ervice to · the

-

This is service either with the active forces, the rese:g:ve forces, or in

~ombiru:i.ti,q,tt, thereof.

It does

should exceed eight years.

~

agree A hat thiS?Jtrriod of obligatory service

Fur•thermore, it feels that this period of qbligation /

should be subject to reduction by the Presidenth,hen force levels ha~e been reached
in the !.,Ct~~ forces and in the expanded reserveA.n order that the manpower pool
may not increase~eyond the !!!Rm~. figure necessary to provide a source of
military establishment.

. ··

Failure to hold the manpower

result in many young men escapi~ service, . and the
average a e of inductees increasing to · unacceptable figures •

be tw~ and two;t only ..•
The first sourse/would be from

&.;.;;;.;;.;.-..........-c.,.e

personnel with remaining periods

of obligatory servic~ or,. those who have . 2tschst&e<\. .. l!J~!r obli_&,_ator s eryiceiwn o

- 'f -

-5. . .
can be induced to remain in the rese~ on a voluntary Lt>a~s.

The s;e9,p_<:J.. sfJ,Pfz$.e /

wou.::i..d be ~on-prior s,:r~c;: men who enlist in .~he re.~ erve component~ thfoughout the
count,ry/and irmnediately thereafter-" go on active duty for training for a ;period of
six months.

After this training is completedAhey then return to their reserve

uni ts for a period of seven and one-b~lf years.
to use _'49;1¢h methods;.

.ij;.

servie_e s s ~ - be. .!..:_q ui::~

The numbers who would be trained/wou).d be the maxim~ ·

......

consistent with
the existence
of facilities
available
funds.
.
·~:
,, and
.·
..
~
·

It shou+d be

noted that the Department of Defense recommends this traiinin,g plm be on a
carefully controlled basi s and 1 it is our understanding., intends it to apply _only
1
the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.
It should l:e noted that under

~

their i?res~nt
a somewhat "simi~.
?1' p~anfohich
th~y ._ call
..... progra:mAhe Navy· is· . following
.
.
.
.

.

"Accelerated Reservists Trainingn.

.

',

.

Consistent with the position stated above, we

recommend that a floor be placed under the number that would be trained py this .

- .......

-

method, and that : : - floor would be 120.,000 trained ~ually/ror all t _h e mil_i tary
·

..

services.. It should be borne in mind that this floor reprei:;ents only 75,000 man .
years of trainee/which should not tax the traini.!lr facilities of the military
establishmentAo a si. gnificant : degree•

-

The size of the reserve~s the next logical point to discuss.
The bill before you establishes a total of five milli~n men in the ~serve~,
divided between a _3,000,000 man re-defined Ready Feserve and a 2,000,000 m.an
re~defined Standby Reserve.
It is the opinion of the Asro ciation that the total resel"'.ve should consist of
approximately t,2:ee mill~o,e. ·reservists.
Ready Reserve,
.

a3

We would :recommend th.at the three rnilli.on

recormnended
in this legislation., be the total reserve
and that . the
.
.
.

Standby Reserve as recommended in this legislation, re.vert to: ·the general manpower
pool.

---·

The Standby R'ese:rve, .a s recommended _in this bill,. can not· be or_d eredt to
. "
. ..
. . :
.,-active duty/except with the-~approval of _the ~~-lect~ ~ervi.9£l • . furthermore,. this
'

bill provides
no opportuni~; f~r
training
in. the
S.t andby
Reserye~cept
on
a.
.
--.
..
..,.
as,
. , .
·.
·.
,
. . .·
.
volunteer, unpaid basis/and offers no . oppo~t~itr. ~o_r ~r9}}!_2 1i~ or advan~ememt to

-S-

-~ u

1:•

'

-

It is our opinion that it ts not a reserve at

its members ..

to the securitz of our country,

allkd adds nothi~~

The Association would not change the present definitions contained in the
RP.ssr:e Forces Act of 1952 for the Ready, Standby, and Inactive reserves, al though
we woi.lld suggest changing the name of the Standbz Reserve to "Mobilization Reserv~
A careful study of these existing definitions shows clearly that they accomplish
precisely the same objectives as the new definitions suggested by the Department
of Defense~

th the exception of the control by Selective Service over the

proposed "Standb;:r'.' Reserve"•

-

-

The main difference between our positions is one of size..

The Association

would divide the three:. million men in the Ready Reserve, as recommended by the
Department of Defense; into a Readr, Standby, and Inactive Reserve/a s established
by present law•

The

~SflQY

Reserve vrould be the

would be subjeet to the call of the President.
exceed OM cmd a half million men.

only part ?f ihe reserve/which
In -our opinion this ·should not

It will be noted in the Associqtion plan/

attached hereto/that the million and a half in the Jteadz Reserve would be divided

-

into two groups of similarly trained and equipped units and individuals.

· The

first would be a so-called "Hurricane" force, the second, -t he "Support" force.
Now, Mr. Chairman, the term "Hurricane force" is not intended to be a legal
term but is rather a descriptive term-.

This force, backed up by the "Support"

force~ ith only a sli~htly less degree of i~ediate readines/would constitute our
~

Reserve.

Membership in this IIHurricane" force and "Supi:,ort," force would be

encouraged by s ecial ~nducP..Inents and incentives, includin~but not limitedx to 1
extra emoluments, identif ·ng and distinctive .unifo:r

~

0.

markers, and priority

receipt of full combat e uipment and· realistic training facilities.

To the

greatest ext~nt possibl/ ; t would be manned by; ~ ; :rvi;~;e·; sc~ho would be

-

induced to serve in the Ready Reserve force.

This Ready Reserve wcu.ld be subject

to the call of the President.

-

~

-

The balance of the three mi_llion total re.s erve w ould be in the Standbz.
Reserve/end would be organized,_ equipped, and traine<J, precisely the same as the
Rn:;i,-ly He serve.

pre~~t~ona

-

rt would have , .11!:?e;'!;eJ , .. a l ~ e:i:_ d~~re2, .. 2£. gt.i,2.rjj,;r ~

i evini

adiness.

It, :~s the belief of the Asso~iationfehat everything po;:;sible should be done t o

put the s a-called "Hurricane" forceA.nto a high de ree of readiness at
pra~t:i.cab~: _d~· . We would put a target date of ~ Y

l.222.

for completion of

organizing, equipping and starting of intensive training. _
As previously indicated we would call the reserve, other than those in the
Ready reserve, a "Mobilization Reserve" instead of a "Standby Reserve~',

This· is · a.

much more d~e£r~pti~ title~articularly since it can only be called to duty, for
other . than training, by the Congress.
We know that it will re argued that a }...a r g!f Ready Reserve is requir.ed, but we
1

believe that such a concept, as expressed in the legislation before you, stems f~om
war plans designed to meet the requirements of full mobilization.
that the next war may start, by an all-out attack on our country.

:it is recognized
That, of course,

would bring in all reseryesh rith the fullest support of the Congress, .
However, we cannot accept 1'.concept/ that we should t;ie our ready reserve
structure t o a plan/ that would require the use of 3,000,000 menA n ~ddition
active f orces.

There may be

~

t y-pes .· of small wars/which will re~uire ·a

partial mobilization on a very urgent basis.

-

small Ready Reserve is imperative.
.
.

to_.?ur .

If such is the case, a relati~ly .

If, however~ the entir~ three million iEr

needed, then it is our opinionfehat such a need/s tems .from

~9~ 1 wa:r.

Certainly/

there will not be such damage/that tne Congress could not take any action necessa:ry;.
to permit the use of all reserves.
The Association supports

the

·c~ncept of developing ~-~h~d,~A o en~orce

· a · on in reserve tra:j..ning. . It is in aocord with plans to p: riodic~ll
order to :ctiv,: duty, against their wi,11, 1:.hose reservists who do not participate
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...

in training actiVJ.'1,:1.es

l.,l

9,1.·uer to

D1q.:1.1r~d.in

tne:i..r readine~s.

FUrthermore, it,

supports the concept that re$erves who entered . the · progltain thro~h- the six-months
training methodhiust participate actively in reserve tr;iining~

;Failure to meet

the requir~ standards,lshould result in t~at reservist being ordered to active
duty/ by the appropriate Secretar~ concerriedfror an
This is not a ~unitiY§!. measure.

add;i.t,+QP@J-

pe~i.od of .2h, ~ .

The decision to enter the reserves through the

si:>:-S9J1t~ route /was a vo~unta~7 choice/ on the part of the individual.

--

~f, at a

later time, he changes his mind and decides not to carry out his original
merely reverts to the service he had originally rejected.

plan~e

The Department of

Defense only recommends,4,hat such reservists become liable for induction for an
additional l18 mon:tll§,
Wl1

We feel he should asslllle the ...........
same degree of service/which
.

he had previously elected to reject.
The Association also recommends that this proposed reserve legislation~ e
amended to include specific authori tyh or twel v~ weekend training periods vi th the
pay equivalent of

kB ~.~lJ...s.

It is possible that this can be done administra~i!~~ ,

but that a congressional directive as expressed in law for such training, where
appropriate, would do

~

to improve the degree of readiness of all uni ts

/and

particularly those
While it has been previously stated, it is believe d to be necessary for
emphasis, to repeat that members of the recommended ~.Qpiljzati.Q.p Reserve, or as is

-

presently called the Sta~ Reserve, with the exception of those who are on the
Inactive duty list,. should be organized, equipped, ancl trained in precisely the

---------

______,...
__

same way as those in the Ready Reserve. · The only difference
between
,..._ .......
..._.,......._the ttRea
and "Mobilization" Reserve would be i

"

thes.e arrangements /

The Association concurs in the theory of constantly screening the reserves,
and eli'minating those whose skills are such as to require their . being in the

- f'-

..

'

.

domestic economy.

/

..,

Howeve1: ,.. it is noted in the bill/as introduc~d/that
there is a
. .
.
.

provision contained on page

19, line 7,. subsection (d), which would permit an

appro!)riate Secretary to di.sqharge

!Dl member of the reserve component ho is in

ex~cs s of mobilization requirements in any category of skill or qualifications.
The Associati~n believes t h a t ~ sectio~ must be re~ised~o m~e certain/ that
such separations are made
skills in industry.

onJl to implement

the program of pre>tecti.n_i essential

In its present -formA ~ is too broad

a:d _too ,general /to do

other than cause concern.
One of the major deficiencies in the bill under discussion t as its fai"lure ·torecognizeA he absolute need to provide for an orderly flow of
officers into the reserve program.

oun · rese:e

""

We are pleased to note from the testimony of

Mr. Burgess /that he intends to recommend amendments to ~0rrect this omission.
Basically, such officers c.ome into the Reserve through the ROTC program,

Under·

present conditions/ the purposes of this program have been distorted to become a
procurement programfror the needs of the active services.
the ROTC progr;~

The pr$,mary purpose of

s to provide YOUQ~ officers to meet mobilization requirements.,.

The Association feels that this bill should include specific authority and.:
direction~ hat . the

~

program be re-designed to meet its established mission/to

provide the · officer personnel for mobilization requirements.

We recommend that ·

the num~rs in the program be consist~nt with that objective/ and that wion
graduation all ROTC graduates .will be commissioned •. Those in excess of mobilization
requirements,4rill be orde.r ed to active quty for · training ~or. si~ month/ and then
~

attached to reserve uni ts for a period of seven and one-half years obligatory ·
service.
There is much talk of induceme1:1t.s and incentives to improve interest in
and the !]lorale of reservists.

The Association has · a strong and fundamental

belief thathn substantial . part ·. ; the present ~

- morale. and f"'f! efficienc

reserves /stems from certain $!Si.J.1 oorrectible faults on the part of the
establishment•.

of the

i:esul~

There ha~., in the . p~s~, :l lot. ·beell an, acceptance of the concept

- r-

by a part of the re ular establishment!t~a~ -the reserves are an iq~e£r,a
our

~ military structure fond not a mere adJur;iat, to

part of

the ref/iuJ..~ establishment•

This has resulted, unfortunately, in discrimination and ·attitudes,' particularly
in personnel procedures, which can only ind;i.cate that~ n the minds of
personnel

!2.~ re gula:r

/a reservist is a S!;,corid: cl.~~ member of the military team.

Therefore, the Association believes that -~ora}~ can only be soundly improved /
when~ relatively simple, but perhaps difficult to · achieve, criteria are ·met. _
First:

We must, through every device possible, so educate every ·
American to accept the concep / that .there · is .an obligation
of citizenship on the part of each Arnerican~o support our
security programs, in general, a _nd that every able-bodied
American of appropriate ag/owes ~.&h.t years of obligatory
service to the military.

Second:

The services must give each ind;ividual such progressive and · ·
worthwhile trainingfi,hat he will believe that what he is
doing is worthwhile;:nd that it is a proper discharge of this
citizenship obligation.

Third:

The services must develop and constantly maintain proper
systems of adminis·trationho provide equitable procedures
for prtmotion, retirement, pay, etc. , and

Fourth, · The reservist must be recognized as an important part of,
and not an adjunct to, our military establishment~ nd be.
treated accordingly.
If these criteria are met, tne details of the incentives and inducements become
easier to accomplish.

For example, they might take the form of certain additional

payments h or the signing of a contract to insure active and continued service in
the reserve, or a discharge of their eight years of obligatory service at an
accelerated ratei by service· on active duty/or for participa~ion in the Ready .

-/0-

reserve as distinct from the Mobilization (standby) reserve •. There are many
relatively lnexoensive methods that can be developed/to make an individtial anxious
e.nd willing to serve in the reserve

g,

a whole• .

The Association has a furth3 r sUgt estion to make •. We recognize that this
bill was primarily designed to solve the enlisted manpower procurement program •.
"'

We have already suggested a broadening of this conce~t/ although we have also
indicated that we believe there is little need to change much of the existing iaw
dealin 6 with the reserves.
of the

I-,e ople

We feel, however, that this bill, which in the eyes

will be labeled as the "National Reserve Plan" for some other

dis tine ti ve title, should solve some of the other }J'Oblems which have impeded the
reserves in various ways under existing law,
Therefore, we recommend the addition of a new title to the bill~ nto llhich
will be placed some of the various bits of legislation presently before the
Congress, to the end that when this bill is· enacted /we will have cleaned tip a·
great many of the legislati~~ problems that presently are disturbing us.
I

of example, we su~est that this new title include rehabilitation a
on continuous active duty~

BY way

for · reserves

o ar~ separated i~n.v.o.l;..Q~_,,,~ due to reductions in

fore/after long tours of crntinuous active duty.

There is a plan, which has

already been submitted to your staff, which has approval within the Department of·
Defense, and is designed to cushion the shock of the separation of these
individuals whi

n fact~ ave been career employees for periods extending up to 19

years on active duty.
Similarly,

there is a question of broken
service for SPARS and WACS ~which
¥ •
ti

$

for some time/ and which ~ ould be resolved,
Another matter v.hich we earnestly recommend for the consideration of the
Committee, is the fact that we should endeavor to clean up - once and for all
the problem of reservists who have served on continuous active duty for such
periods of time that they, in fact1 have become career personnel, We are constantly

- II-

recommending bi ts and pieces of legislation designed to correct ia,equi ties '?hi ch
result from this problema
Without such re~ervists, the armed forces cannot possib\y meet their
commitments.

Over 80% of the officers of the Air Force and Army on active duty ~

are reservistso

Smaller percentages prevail in the Navy and Marine Corps.·

We

know of no line of endeavor h,,here an employee who works for the same employer for
a period

of~, ~1J~e~~,

or twent years~s not considered a c::::r employee.

Yet these reserve officers/who are holding :esponsible posi tkns on g.p~iX~ duty /
and are as well qualified as the so-called regular, who frequently has had the
same education and the same type of service training · and record as the reservist/
are E.2.!:, 11 career 11 men. .

Human nature being what it is/the r,es~rvi,~t on active duty /

is constantly being discriminated against~n matters of promotion, command
assignment, retirement, etc.
Therefore, we suggest to this Committee~hat an amend~ent be .written into this ·
Reserve legislation~to provide that, except in time of war or general mobilization,
when a reserve has been on continuous active duty for a period of ei§h~ years~hat
he will at that time be screened for fitness to be retained on active duty.

If he

is deemed to be fit for retention~e willl::.e given the opportunity to be integrated
in his present rank and status. This will solve a great many of the problems which
now plague us all~nd it cert~inly will bring about a higher degree of morale and
efficiency~n the part of individuals who have been living under the shadow of
forces beyond their control.
There are undoubtedly other items of this type which should be considered/and

-

the Association earnestly urges that this be done • . 11e do not believe that they
will jeopardize the passage of the bill as a whole.

Similarly, we do not feel ·-

j ~ r : f ' ~ ~...
that the discussions which involve the
th-:i:&,,•b i i i ~- a,-,w~,e,, will

,µ.A•~

:~~R>~. . .

.

Jl«t'~~~~.,

slow dowh the ~ass.ag&.-oe

e l ~ J:J...ftl, ~

0-,

-

~se,,~,tems. . In fact/we believe that the presence of a

,rounded program with a g,le,~ ~ ,of existing defects/will ,~mqqH~ the way for prompt

- / al.-

f

'

Congressional approval of this legislation.
In closing, I want to reaffirm our Association's beliefA hat the enactment
of reserve legislation

A,o accomplish the

Defense bill, is essential.

objectives set out in the Department of

'!'he amendments we have suggested are constructive.,

and will, in our opinion, give us the type of reserve that the Department of
Defense needs to meet their obligations.
We hold firmly to the beliefA,hat the m~m-~~ number of personnel should
be placed under the control of the President/and that the !!l~J~~H:'.il-1 of t he

,

reservists should be subject only to the will of the people /speaking through the
Congress.
We believe that the real heart of the improvement in our Reserve Progra/ ; s
in the development of realistic training/ supported by proper facilities ~ t the
earliest possible date.

Along with this broad plan should go a crash progr.~ /

to bring the p.e:3-,(]y Reserve, as outlined in our plan, to a J;u.£tl degree, of
readiness ~ t the earliest possible moment.

·

It is our sincere belief that/as our reserve improves/ we can have ~?I;.:fi<!~9S.e
in its readiness.

It should then be possible to more safely reduce the size of

our ~ : : :blishment~ ithout jeopardizing our country's security,

THANK YOU 1

- /.3 -

